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Introduction
this article analyzes incomes policies in argentina. In particular, we 
study the role of social and wages policies during the years 2001-2008. 
In this regard we’ll comment on the effectiveness of policies towards 
the reduction of poverty and show how they are strongly conditioned 
by macroeconomic policy objectives and by argentina’s mode of capi-
talist participation in the world’s economy.
our argument is that the peripherical position of argentina’s eco-
nomy and the correlative policy of undervalued real exchange rate and 
public sector’s fiscal surplus, limit the government’s ability to allow for 
a clearly pro-poor income’s policy (including social and wages poli-
cies). the need for “competitiveness” and foreign debt payments puts 
immediate pressure on wages, incomes and labour conditions for the 
working people.
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from this framework we propose that argentina’s government fa-
ces two radically different alternatives. on the one hand, accepting long-
term poverty while it attempts to structurally improve the economy’s 
competitive stand on a low wages, low labour rights, low productivity 
development path. this implies accepting not only the current unequal 
distributive structure but also systemic and general social unrest linked 
to the unjust distribution of income and the correlative pervasiveness of 
income poverty. as an alternative, the government could transform its 
social security system in a generalized income distributive program of 
the Basic Income type. such a system may not only put an end to long-
term income poverty, also increasing economic democracy and political 
participation, but may also reduce social conflict to allow for sufficient 
levels of investment and socio-technical innovation.
first we present an analysis of social and wages policies in argen-
tina since the crisis of 2001/2002. then we discuss how the internatio-
nal insertion of argentina’s economy limits the ability these policies to 
reach their objectives. afterwards we present an alternative to today’s 
social and wages policies: the basic income. we discuss its main cha-
racteristics in relationship with argentina’s current situation. finally 
we present some conclusions and the bibliographical references.
Social and wages policies in Argentina
since the crisis of 2001-20021
after the crisis of the Convertibility Program in 2001/2 social and wa-
ges policies have changed greatly in argentina. In the nineties, policy 
interventions regarding extreme poverty were reduced to few and li-
mited programs. In particular, the so-called “plan Trabajar” in its diffe-
rent versions was a program of subsidies for unemployed workers in 
exchange for community work. this program included about 300,000 
beneficiaries by the end of the decade and was accompanied by several 
other marginal social programs. regarding the policies for employed 
workers most of the government’s intervention pointed towards the 
flexibilisation of modalities of work and work-contracts. wage policy 
was restricted to establishing a rule that affectively fixed real wages 
for the members of the manufacturing industries. In other branches, 
nominal (and real) wages actually fell during the latter part of the de-
cade in particular since the crisis begun in 1998.
1  In this article we refer to social policies as public programs and actions that ope-
rate a redistribution of income to the poorest sectors of the labour class. In principle, 
their financing through taxes indirectly affects the mass of profits. wage policies 
attempt to affect the incomes of the different sections of the working class through 
a direct redistribution of income at the point of production. In this case the negative 
impact on profits is transparent.
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as a general rule in argentina during the Convertibility social po-
licy followed the residual and individualized patterned favoured by 
the world Bank while labour policies provided an efficient and effec-
tive limit to wage increases and promoted the precarisation of work 
(féliz, 2005)2.
the hecatomb caused by the end of the Convertibility plan pro-
duced the preconditions for a different type of policy intervention. on 
the one hand, the explosion of social conflict during the crisis created 
a real menace to political stability (Bonnet, 2002). Mobilizations by 
unemployed workers and protests of small bank-deposit holders whe-
re generalized. the final days of the Convertibility where accompanied 
by the resignation and appointment of three different presidents in a 
matter of days. within this context the national government took seve-
ral measures that would change altogether the development strategy. 
the abandonment of the Convertibility plan implied the devaluation 
of the currency, the conversion of all dollar-denominated credits and 
deposits to the national currency (peso argentino) and the establish-
ment of a tax on exports, amongst other changes.
the government to promote political and social stability created 
the program “Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados” (JJhD) for unem-
ployed heads of households. this program extended the benefits of 
the previous Trabajar programs to several hundred thousands benefi-
ciaries within few months. while the program included the obligation 
of community work in exchange for the subsidy this duty was me-
rely nominal. since the main objective was to calm down the political 
unrest (golbert, 2004) the government did little to control the actual 
performance of the counterpart activities formally required (neffa et 
al., 2008).
the magnitude of the program put on the agenda the possibility 
of its extension and transformation into a wider income-support pro-
gram. Pérez et al. (2006) have analyzed this possibility and proposed 
to picture it as the embryo of a Basic Income Program. this was cer-
tainly a possibility since the decree that created it (presidential Decree 
565/2002) stated “all unemployed men and women heads of house-
holds will benefit from the family right to social Inclusion”. howe-
ver, the government elected in 2003 (president nestor Kirchner) deci-
ded to progressively discontinue the program turning it into several 
2  the Convertibility plan was an all encompassing neoliberal program (based on 
the washington Consensus but even more radical) that instated a currency board 
fixing the domestic currency (peso) to the united states’ dollar at a 1 to 1 parity, 
forbidding price and wage indexation, completing a reduction on trade tariffs and 
pushing through a generalized process of privatizations and labour market flexibili-
zation.
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programs oriented towards family support (program “plan Familias 
por la Inclusión Social”; families for social Inclusion or plan Familias 
–for short–) and professional education for the unemployed (program 
“Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo”, sCe; Insurance for Professional 
training and employment), amongst other minor programs.
the main social program would be the plan Familias that was 
meant to replace the program JJhD as an income-support scheme. 
while the recipients of the program JJhD would remain receiving 
$150 a month (about us$50 in 2003) in exchange for community 
work, the plan Familias was oriented towards mothers with many 
children and would receive up to $305 a month (us$101 in 2003) 
for sending them to school and guaranteeing their vaccination. all 
other beneficiaries of the JJhD should either find work (salaried or 
in self-employment) or opt for one of the other programs all of which 
actually required them to participate in a work-project or actively 
search for employment. Between May 2003 and June 2008 the JJhD 
lost 1.36 million beneficiaries (secretaría de empleo, 2008) 599,802 
of which found employment. In 2008 the government expected to 
have 700,000 beneficiaries in the plan Familias two-thirds of which 
would be ex-beneficiaries of the program JJhD (subsecretaría de 
Presupuesto, 2008).
the principal limitations of the new programs were two. first, the 
combination of the plan Familias and the Program sCe resulted in the 
reinstatement of a conditioned world Bank-type income support poli-
cy. while the program JJhD was an universalistic program (in theory, 
and somewhat in practice) that gave unconditioned income support 
(cash transfers) to families in need, the plan Familias and the Program 
sCe –together– put families in the obligation of meeting a participa-
tion criterion that forces women back into their homes to take care 
of their children and men to look for work of any kind (precarious at 
best) to remain beneficiaries. second, in contrast with the pervasive-
ness of poverty and unemployment, the new social programs were still 
greatly insufficient. while the JJhD paid $150 to beneficiaries (equi-
valent to 73% of the individual –not the family’s– poverty line in 2002 
and only 47% in 2008), the plan Familias gave families just 97% of the 
individual poverty line. the Program sCe paid $225 a month to each 
beneficiary (us$71 in 2008), equivalent to about 71% of the individual 
poverty line3.
3  In these estimations we consider the poverty line for an “adult-equivalent” (adult, 
male, between 35 and 55 years of age), while in most cases the actual beneficiaries 
of social program are extended families with many children. this line represented 
about us$100 in 2008.
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It is true that public expenditure has grown significantly in the 
last five years. Public outlays on social assistance expenditures, emplo-
yment programs and unemployment benefits have grown 50% in real 
terms between 2002 and 2006. In relationship with the incidence of 
poverty the increase has been somewhat larger: real expenditures (on 
such items) per poor person have grown 155%. however, they remain 
completely insufficient since social assistance expenditure represents 
just about $103 (us$32) a month per person in poverty and emplo-
yment programs plus unemployment benefits equal $259 (us$82) a 
month for each unemployed worker. In any case, total expenditure in 
these programs topped just 1% of gDP.
Parallel to these social policies the government has implemented 
–since 2002– a new wages and employment policy. after the great shock 
of the Convertibility’s bust that greatly reduced real wages and levels 
of employment, government’s policy in this regard allowed for a per-
sistent recuperation. the improvement on labour’s working conditions 
was allowed by the rapid increase in production, investment and con-
sumption that begun during the second quarter of 2002. this process of 
accelerated valorisation of capital –that lasted until 2008– created the 
objective conditions for the change in the dynamics of wages.
the new policy regarding labour included the increase in the mi-
nimum wage, the renegotiation of collective agreements and, in the 
beginning, an active state intervention by decreeing nominal wage 
increases. the minimum wage was increased from $200 in early 2003, 
accumulating a 158% rise by 20074. according to the Ministry of La-
bour the number of collective agreements negotiated jumped from an 
average of 200 a year before 2002 to more than 1,000 in 2007. During 
the years 2002-2005 the government decided several wage increases 
for salaried workers of the private sector with formal (registered) em-
ployment. these unilateral wage increases pushed up real wages sig-
nificantly for these employees. however, for state employees and for 
private sector workers with precarious (un-registered) employment 
the government policy was much less benevolent. the disparity in 
wage distribution widened significantly. In 2007 real wages for the 
formal workers were 6.7% over its level of 2001 while for precarious 
workers real wages were still 22.4% lower and state employees were 
28.4% below its 2001 level.
this type of intervention was not simply the result of the new 
political ideology of the government or the improvement in economic 
conditions but also the response to growing uneasiness within the la-
4  significantly, while the private sector’s minimum wage increased by 1.5 times in 
real terms in the period, the benefit of the program JJhD remained fixed at $150.
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bour movement (féliz and Pérez, 2007). within the working class the-
re was rising turmoil due to mounting grassroots organization. the 
reduction in unemployment and economic expansion was giving pla-
ce for stronger workers’ organization within the working places outsi-
de the direct control of union directions (Prensa de frente, 2005). the 
government interpreted the situation as troublesome since worker’s 
demands for more rapid increases in incomes were, according to bu-
siness representatives, putting pressure on economic competitiveness 
(e.g., profitability). this conflict manifested in an increasing inflation: 
capital’s attempt to maintain its profit rate and keep wages down re-
sulted in the political need for anti-inflationary policy and control over 
wages and labour conflict (féliz, 2007b: 73-74).
In this context the somewhat pro-labour policy lasted only a couple 
of years, since by mid-2005 the government had taken the decision to 
reduce its pro-labour interventions. the response by the government 
in 2006 was to establish tight wage limits. this limits where to be gua-
ranteed in the agreements between the two labour’s national unions 
(Confederación General del Trabajo, Cgt, and Central de los Trabajadores 
Argentinos, Cta) and employers (private and public).5 the government 
proposed a limit to wage increases equal to 19% for that year and 16.5% 
for 2007. while the official inflation rate was 9.8% in 2006 (down from 
the 12.3% of 2005) many observers (including workers within the offi-
cial institute of statistics InDeC) claimed actual inflation to be at least 
twice as much (ate/InDeC, 2008). In 2007, the rapid improvement 
in labour’s incomes reached its limit (féliz, 2008b). the combination 
of successful repression of non-institutionalized conflicts, tight control 
(at times violent) by union leaders of grass-root movements and the 
difficulties for the creating political alternatives constricted the ability 
of workers to claim a larger share of value added. In 2008 labour’s parti-
cipation in value added stagnated. while it had increased steadily since 
2003, it still remained below its 2001 level (Lozano, 2009).
Argentina after 2002: dependent capitalism
and macroeconomic limitations to pro-labour
social and income policies
as we stated in the introduction we understand that the effectiveness 
of poverty reduction policies is strongly conditioned by macroecono-
5  the Cgt is the main labour organization representing most workers, particularly 
within the private sector. Its leadership lies today in the trucker’s union (Camione-
ros), lead by hugo Moyano. the Cta, born in the early nineties, is composed mainly 
by state employees, professors and teachers. Its current leader, hugo Yasky, comes 
from Ctera (the main teacher’s union).
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mic policy objectives and by argentina’s participation in the world’s 
economy. In fact, the aforementioned restrictions and limitations po-
sed by argentina’s government on social and income policies since 
2002 are closely tied to the characteristics of argentina’s economy af-
ter neoliberal restructuration and its effects on economic policy.
within the peripherical position of argentina’s economy the par-
ticular strategy adopted by governments to confront those limits –and 
the economic policy associated to them– can alter its ability to allow 
for a pro-poor, pro-labour income’s policy. governments are never to-
tal constrained by structural restrictions since they may take policy 
choices that solve some of the immediate social and economic pro-
blems while they help create the conditions to progressively displace 
those restrictions.
an orthodox (neoliberal) strategy –that adapts to structural limita-
tions instead of trying to change them– may restrict the government’s 
ability to move towards growing equality in the distribution of life 
chances, income and wealth. on the contrary, a policy choice that 
confronts existing structural restrictions might be able to move those 
limits, making room for more progressive income distribution and 
inclusive policies. since 2002, the macroeconomic policy choice of 
argentina’s government (devalued currency, public sector’s fiscal sur-
plus, the decision to obtain competitiveness by reducing labour costs 
and the strategy of payment of the foreign debt) has put immediate 
pressure on wages and incomes for the working people also limiting 
the policy alternatives and their efficacy.
argentinean economy is deeply integrated in the cycle of capital 
on a global scale. the biggest capitalist firms are strongly transnatio-
nalized in every branch of production (féliz, 2007b). this is manifes-
ted, in part, in the fact that 80% of exports and a third of all imports 
are generated directly by these firms6. Besides, the strong insertion 
of the local cycle of capital in the world’s cycle of capital is expressed 
in that real exports of goods and services represented 12.8% of gDP 
in 2008 (in comparison with only 6.9% in 1993); real imports grew 
from 9.3% of gDP to 10.5% in the same time span. the jump in inter-
national prices allowed for a greater increase in international trade’s 
participation on gDP: exports represented 23.3% and imports 20.7% 
of nominal gDP in 2008 (6.9% and 9.3%, respectively, in 1993).
this intense integration is profoundly asymmetric. In spite of the 
strong advance in labour productivity during the nineties –the period 
of deep regressive restructuration– argentina’s economy is well behind 
6  the 500 largest firms by sales. source: encuesta nacional a grandes empresas 
(enge) of the Instituto nacional de estadísticas y Censos (InDeC).
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the technological frontier in most branches of production. the inter-
national trade of the country shows this. on the one hand, exports are 
concentrated in primary products and its manufactures: they repre-
sented 56.8% of total exports in 2007, without great changes from the 
58.1% in 1998. on the other hand, imports are mostly concentrated in 
inputs and capital goods (76.2% of total imports in 2007 in compari-
son with 76.5% in 1998).
secondly, from the point of view of the circulation of value, the 
distributive structure presents a division of final demand with nota-
ble changes in comparison with the nineties (table 1). these changes 
are the result of the structural transformations that argentina has 
gone through. they have consolidated a pattern of valorisation of ca-
pital based on the super-exploitation of labour and an extroverted 
accumulation (or export-led growth) centred in the exploitation of 
natural goods7.
first, we should highlight the fact that the other face of the super-
exploitation of labour is the reduced weight of popular consumption 
(workers) in total consumption and thus in total demand. as we can 
see, less than a quarter of total final demand is sustained by the value 
needed for the reproduction of the labour force. after 10 years from 
the previous production peak (in 1998) workers have not recovered 
7  we prefer to use the concept of natural goods instead of natural resources. In 
fact, natural resources are natural goods (use-values) turned into capital (values) and 
thus subject to the rules of capitalist valorization.
Table 1
Structure of final demand. Percentage of nominal GDP. Argentina (1993-2007)
Year
Workers
consumption
(a)
Capitalist
consumption
(b)
Investment
(c)
Net exports
(d)
Public sector’s 
deficit
(e)
1993 27.7 41.5 19.1 -2.4 -2.4
1998 22.7 46.4 19.9 -2.5 -0.9
2002 19.3 42.6 12.0 15.0 -0.7
2003 18.8 44.4 15.1 11.2 -2.3
2005 22.5 38.8 21.5 5.9 -3.7
2007 22.9 35.7 24.2 4.3 -3.2
Source: Estimation based on data from the INDEC. (a) We take as workers’ consumption the participation of wages on income, 
deducing the part accrued to the richest 10%. (b) Non-workers consumption is calculated as the difference between total consumption 
and workers consumption. This “non-workers” include those whose income is –as an approximation due to the lack of more precise 
data– strongly derived from surplusvalue (c) Gross fixed investment. (d) Trade of goods and services. (e) Total result of the non-
financial national public sector (NFNPS).
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the level of consumption expenses (in proportion to total value-added) 
of the year 19938.
the super-exploitation of labour represents the reduction of the 
price of the labour force (wages) under its value (cost of reproduc-
tion). Marini explains that this is a typical mechanism in peripherical 
capitalist nations (Marini, 1973). International competition in a si-
tuation of wide inequalities in the access and use of technology com-
pels capitals in peripherical countries to look for alternative means 
to warrant its own valorisation. In this situation the economy creates 
a permanent downward pressure on wages while at the same time it 
tends to increase the value of the labour-power in the peripherical 
country. this occurs because to compete, these capitals increase the 
speed-up of labour (raising the intensity of use). In consequence, the 
cost of reproduction of labour increases, while wages tend do not.
the low level of global expenditure in the reproduction of the la-
bour force is explained mainly by the advancement in the super-exploi-
tation of labour. growing internationalisation of argentina’s capital 
increases the pressures for improving competitiveness. since technolo-
gical innovation takes time, effort (high investment) and socio-political 
stability (something strange to argentina’s recent history) local capitals 
opt for the path of lowest resistance: widespread precarisation of labour 
and super-exploitation. this alternative manifests in levels of incomes 
that, for most of the working families, do not cover the standard family 
consumption basket (sfCB) or even the basic consumption basket9. 
nowadays (early 2009) with –official– open unemployment rates under 
8% of total economically active population, over a third of all families 
remain under the poverty line, and about 80% have incomes below the 
sfCB (about $3,500 a month in 2008)10. to complete the picture, take 
into account that the average wages amounted to $1,617 in 2008 (about 
half the sfCB) and the official minimum wage (that applies only to 
formal workers) reached $1,350.
the historical change in the pattern of appropriation of income 
between classes (from workers to non-workers) has also translated –in 
8  Besides, we must highlight that not only does the working class as a whole appro-
priate of a smaller part of value-added for its own reproduction. this reduced appro-
priation is produced in a context where families turn a growing part of their potential 
labour-power into active labor force for capitalists. the sustained and systematic 
increase in the rate of participation in the labour market –especially by young people 
and women– is a clear manifestation of this.
9  In 2008, the poverty line equalled to about $1,400 (us$ 440) a month for a repre-
sentative family (2 adults and 2 children).
10  representing about us$1,100. source: our own estimations based on official 
data.
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recent years– into a modification in the way of utilization of surplus 
value. In the nineties, the biggest part of the surplus value was desti-
ned to unproductive expenses: the consumption of dominant classes 
represented almost half of the value-added and approximately 2/3 of 
total surplus value (table 1). that is, the realization of surplus va-
lue was oriented towards branches that produced sumptuary means 
of consumption. By contrast, in the present stage we’ve witnessed a 
re-orientation in the use of surplus value towards productive accu-
mulation. while the consumption of dominant classes continues to 
represent the most part of non-necessary value, this proportion has 
been reduced in favour of productive investment.
Increased accumulation rate is mainly the result of the greater 
profitability of capital created through devaluation of the currency11. 
the rate of profit for concentrated capital (500 largest firms by sales) 
was 10% on average between 1993 and 1998. In the period 1999-2001 
it dropped to 7%, jumping to 13% (on average in 2002-2004) after the 
crisis of the Convertibility (table 2)12. on the other hand, the relation-
ship between profits and wages (or rate of exploitation) jumped from 
an average 54% (1999-2001) to 166% (2002-2004); during the previous 
peak (1996-1998) it had reached 80%13.
In terms of the realization of profits, following the kaleckian 
equation, these equal the sum of capitalist (luxury) consumption, in-
vestment, net exports, and public sector’s deficit (Kalecki, 1977). as 
we can see in table 1 in this new stage investment has gained weight 
as a motor of profit realization (increasing from 33% to 41% of total 
surplus). another expansive factor has been net exports that turned 
into surplus, representing (in 2007) 7.3% of the mass of profits. on the 
contrary, luxury consumption lost participation (from 73% to 57%).
In conclusion, the present stage of capitalist development in ar-
gentina reproduces low levels of wages (super-exploitation of labour) 
within a process of valorisation of capital based on an export-led stra-
tegy built on extraordinary profits (and rents) from the intensive ex-
ploitation of natural-goods14.
11  Increasing international prices for argentina’s main export commodities also 
helps explain recent growth. however, this affects only a small part of the economy 
while devaluation has “helped” capital across all productive branches.
12  Capital has been estimated as the value of brute production minus net profits. this 
represents a fair approximation of circulating capital. the profit rate has been estima-
ted as the ratio between net profits and circulating capital. source: enge/InDeC.
13  this is the ratio between net profits of the biggest 500 firms to the mass of wages 
in those firms. source: enge/InDeC.
14  wages in argentina are especially low in relationship to the historical standards 
of reproduction of the labour force (standard family consumption basket) in the 
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this type of non-central participation in the cycle of internatio-
nal capital requires that the valorisation of capital in argentina to be 
sustained by a pattern of international competitiveness based on a 
high real exchange rate (rer). this is the economic policy side of the 
tendency for the super-exploitation of labour.
the real exchange rate depends on the contradictory interaction of 
the ratio of labour productivity and real wages between different 
national spaces of value production (féliz, 2008a; shaikh, 1991). If 
productivity does not increase fast enough in a country, the compe-
titiveness of its capitals will tend to fall in relation to other coun-
tries unless its real wages suffer from relative stagnation. In other 
terms, if workers do not pay for greater competitiveness though 
higher labour intensity and/or exploitation, capital demands that 
they “finance” it by giving up a share of their incomes (féliz and 
Chena, 2006).
Labour’s super-exploitation manifests in the political need to keep 
private sector’s wages growing at no more than productivity’s growth 
while simultaneously keeping an important share of working families 
with incomes under the basic consumption basket. In argentina, after 
5 years (2003-2008) of a gDP that has grown more than 50% in real 
country, not in absolute us dollar terms or in relationship to other countries in the 
region.
Table 2
Rate of exploitation and profit rate. Percentage. Big firms. Argentina (1993-2004)
Year Rate of exploitation Profit rate
1993 55 8.6
1994 72 10.7
1995 69 9.9
1996 80 10.7
1997 87 11.2
1998 74 9.5
1999 51 6.8
2000 63 7.9
2001 46 5.9
2002 172 14.0
2003 141 10.4
2004 185 13.6
Source: Encuesta Nacional a Grandes Empresas (ENGE/INDEC).
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terms more than a quarter of the population (29.8%) was still poor in 
2008 (Lozano, 2009)15.
real unit labour costs should fall relatively to the rest of the world 
if the government’s high exchange rate policy is to succeed. If real wa-
ges in the private sector increase more than labour productivity, the 
profits of capital will fall. and with it the competitiveness of tradable 
sectors will fall, especially in manufacturing. If the ratio of wages to 
productivity increases more in argentina than in the rest of the world, 
competitiveness tends to fall.
argentina’s recent experience shows that after the jump in com-
petitiveness due to the nominal devaluation –that successfully turned 
into a real devaluation and reduced real wages– the real exchange 
rate has tended to appreciate (figure 1). this has been the result of 
growing relative unit real labour costs since 2003. while real wages in 
argentina are far lower than in 2001, the increase in industrial pro-
ductivity has been well below the productivity growth in the reference 
country (united states).
the fall in competitiveness –due the revaluation of the domestic 
currency– has impacted in net exports. In spite of higher prices for lo-
cal exports the current account surplus has systematically fallen since 
2003. this has been partially compensated by the increase in internal 
relative prices of goods over services, in particular public services with 
high incidence in industrial costs (féliz, 2008a; shaikh, 1991). the in-
dex of implicit prices between goods and services increased until 2007 
by 48.8% in comparison with the year 2001; however, this index has 
fallen 13.5% since its maximum level in 2003.
this tendency towards the appreciation of the real exchange rate 
brings forward another limitation. Dominant fractions of capital will 
try to displace and contain the sustained increase in the different com-
ponents of aggregate demand that might conspire against the reali-
zation of an external surplus. on the one hand, they will try to limit 
growing wages that increase domestic demand for foods and fuels, 
something that may reduce net exports substantially. on the other 
hand, and more importantly quantitatively and qualitatively, the inter-
nationalization of local capital turns it into a strong source of demand 
for imported inputs and capital goods. the relative deterioration of 
net exports is consistent with this evaluation. thus, accumulation 
argentina’s economy confronts another structural limit to the sustai-
ned growth on real wages and improvement in labour conditions. In-
come policies (in particular, regarding wages) soon face the structural 
15  In 1998 –with lower real gDP and lower productivity in manufacturing produc-
tion– poverty incidence was only 18% on average.
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restrictions posed by exchange rate (competitiveness) policy within 
the periphery.
a further restriction of the dependent capitalist reproduction on so-
cial and incomes policies comes from the need to obtain a public sec-
tor surplus big enough to make room for public debt obligations and 
the Central Bank’s strategy of accumulation of international reserves. 
this signals the continuity between the new so-called neo-develop-
mentalist model (2002-2009) and the old neoliberal one (1991-2001). 
the primary fiscal surplus is the reflection of the remaining weight 
of financial capital, which still acts as the general representation of 
capital’s interests (féliz, 2007b).
far from “lip service” by the government to the growing auto-
nomy of the economy vis-à-vis its creditors, the payment in advance 
to the IMf and the Paris Club (in 2005) have only created the illusion 
of autonomy. In fact, together with restructuring most of the foreign 
debt (in 2005) the reconfiguration of the relationship with foreign cre-
ditors just created the necessary conditions for a different division of 
surplus-value between productive and financial capital.
Figure 1
Tendencial (rulc) and measured (rer) real exchange rate. Argentina (2001-2008)
Source: Féliz (2008b). Note: the rer is estimated as the actual nominal exchange rate divided by the producer price index for industry. 
The tendencial rer (rulc) expresses the evolution of relative real unit labour costs between Argentina’s manufacturing industry and the 
United State’s manufacturing industry both corrected by the evolution of the relative prices of goods and services in both countries.
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after the crisis of the Convertibility the continuity of capital’s va-
lorisation required the devaluation of all capital, including fictitious 
capital (e.g. financial debt) created during the nineties and the transi-
tion period (2002-2003). Before the 2005, public debt (mostly foreign, 
in international currency) reached 137% of gDP on average (between 
2002 and 2004). from 2005 onwards, it fell steadily to reach 55% of 
gDP in 2007, a level equivalent to that of 2001. the devaluation of fic-
titious capital of about 33% is approximately the same suffered in the 
international value (in us dollars) of domestically produced commo-
dities (nominal gDP) in the period immediate after to the fall of the 
Convertibility (féliz, 2008a, 2007a)16. the appropriation by internatio-
nal financial capital of more than 10% of gDP in concept of interest 
payments was clearly socially non-viable –in capitalist terms– since it 
represented close to half the surplus-value available for accumulation 
in 2001-2002.
If the capital flight in the late nineties was no more than the res-
ponse of capital to growing difficulties for continual valorisation, the 
positive inflow that begun in 2005 ascertained that the restructuration 
of debt was necessary for financial capital to contribute again to re-
create the fundaments of its own valorisation. this does not mean, 
however, that this form of capital has lost against other forms of (pro-
ductive) capital. In fact, the policy of fiscal surplus registers adequa-
tely the actuality of the power of financial capital.
the origin of such surplus, destined to the accumulation of inter-
national reserves and interest payments, shows its class-fundament. 
It is usually stated that taxes on exports are a key element in today’s 
public sector’s surplus. In fact, in 2007 these rights on exports accoun-
ted for 79.5% of the non-financial national Public sector’s primary 
surplus. however, this surplus is mostly the result of the absolute and 
relative reduction real wages of state’s employees. they have fallen, in 
comparison with 2001, in absolute terms (at least 15%) and relative 
terms (in relationship to real gDP growth).
In the short run the existence of a boom in international prices, 
coupled to the real devaluation of the currency, allowed the govern-
ment to partially contain the contradiction between surplus (finan-
cial capital’s interests) and public employee’s wages. high commodity 
prices let the government obtain extraordinary finance that comes 
from abroad. the existence of extraordinary rents in the branches 
of intensive exploitation of natural goods has reduced the pressure 
16  the dollar price of nominal gDP fell by 41% between 2001 and 2004 (féliz, 
2008a).
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that the growing employee’s demands put on the primary surplus.17 
when these rents fall because of falling international prices (and it’s 
already happening) and demand and/or growing domestic costs, the 
possibility of a renewed adjustment in the public sector will increase 
considerably.
this section shows that argentina’s mode of participation on the 
cycle of global capital affects the level of wages and the conditions of 
labour’s reproduction while at the same time severely restricting the 
room for social and income policies. the main conclusions so far are:
1. argentina’s current economic regime creates a pattern of circu-
lation of value that globally limits the participation of workers 
in total income. within this restriction, the current high-profits/
rents export led model favours investment over sumptuary con-
sumption.
2. surrounded by this global restriction, in argentina peripheral ca-
pitalist competition pushes the reproduction of labour to the edge 
of the precarisation of living conditions. this appears under the 
form of super-exploitation of labour: wages do not keep up with 
the social cost of reproduction of labour, thus the increasing rela-
tive poverty and stagnating absolute poverty levels.
3. argentina’s peripherical insertion on the cycle of global capital 
tends to enhance the contradiction between increasing wage stan-
dards and preserving capital’s competitiveness. this creates infla-
tionary pressures and a tendency for the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate.
4. Dependence on global financial capital creates a pressure on 
argentina’s government to maintain a significant primary public 
budget surplus. this contradicts the demands of public employees 
for higher wages and the increasing claims for social expenditu-
res (in particular, in the form of income-support or cash-transfer 
programs).
Alternatives in social policies: from the neo-liberal 
agenda to a pro-labour radical proposal 
within this context we propose that argentina’s government faces two 
main alternatives. on the one hand, the current situation of accepting 
long-term relative (and absolute) poverty while it attempts to structu-
17  It is important to highlight that rents from natural resources are not caused by 
external forces such as high international prices. these generate additional pressures 
to redistribute the already existing rents, which are caused by the monopoly power 
over certain resources.
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rally improve its competitive stand on a low wages, poor labour rights, 
low productivity development path. this implies accepting not only 
the current structure of income distribution but also a systemic and 
general social unrest. the short-run alternative is to transform its so-
cial security system into a generalized income redistribution program 
of the type of a Basic Income. such a system may not only put an end 
to long-term income poverty but may also –as we will discuss– redu-
ce social conflict to allow for greater levels of investment and socio-
technical innovation. Moreover, in our opinion the latter choice could 
create the basic conditions for the further, deeper transformation in 
socio-economic and political structures that bind argentina to the afo-
rementioned peripherical, dependent capitalist development path.
this alternative proposal is not just a theoretical option but also 
the demand of many social and political organizations in argentina. 
since the mid-nineties social movements born from the agitation and 
opposition to neoliberal policies have favoured and fought for chan-
ges in income policies. their opposition to the world Bank’s choice 
(focalized income support or cash transfers for the deserving poor) 
has led them progressively to engage in a political battle to impose on 
the state the alternative of non-conditional, universal income grants 
(cash transfers). amongst these organizations and their proposals we 
may refer to the frente nacional Contra la Pobreza (frenaPo, natio-
nal front against Poverty), the Central de los trabajadores argentinos 
(Cta, argentina’s second largest national trade union confederation) 
and the frente Popular Darío santillán (fPDs, Popular front Darío 
santillán)18. In early December 2001 –a few days before the so-called 
“Battle of Buenos aires” (Dinerstein, 2002) that ousted president De 
la rua and ended Convertibility– the frenaPo carried out a Popular 
Consult to promote a universal income benefit (cash transfer) for each 
children under 18 years of age; about 2 million people voted in favour 
of this proposal in the consult (Página/12, 2001). the Cta –a foun-
ding member of the frenaPo– has carried on with the proposal onto 
the present (Cta, 2005). finally, the fPDs has been proposing for se-
veral years now the implementation a basic income (unconditional 
cash transfer) for all families –including those in unemployment– and 
more recently a universal income equal to the basic consumption bas-
ket (fPDs, 2009). In 2009 there are several parliamentary proposals 
to implement a particular form of these programs, which have recei-
18  the fPDs is a social organization of new type comprising movements of unem-
ployed workers, university students, salaried-workers, peasants and social, cultural 
and political activist and collectives. Born in 2005, the fPDs has more than 2,500 
members in several provinces of argentina.
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ved support –or at least lip service– by most candidates in argentina’s 
most recent national elections.
argentina’s social security (ss) has been since its origin tied to 
the dynamics of the labour market. the financing of social security 
came mainly from the contributions from labour, paid by workers and 
capitalists in different proportions. By the mid-eighties this contri-
butions amounted to more than 35% of the payroll. however, by that 
time it became clear that the system was impossible to finance on its 
original bases. the growing pauperization (first relative, then abso-
lute) of the working class since the late fifties threw the system into 
financial collapse. the first impulse had been to patch the system with 
additional funding from other sources (income taxes, import duties) 
without altering its essence. In the nineties the domination of the neo-
liberal agenda proposed a twist: to privatize the system altogether as a 
way to salvage it. however, the results were horrendous and gave pla-
ce to its re-estatisation in 2008 (CenDa, 2008). the new reforms have 
not backed off –however– from the main structural transformations 
of the old system: increased years of working life and postponement 
of retirement age.
In general, the debate regarding recent changes did not include the 
criticism to the theoretical background of social security reform. Priva-
tization as well as re-estatisation had both been justified on a particular 
way of understanding the production and circulation of value in a ca-
pitalist economy. the basic idea is that value is something that can be 
accumulated and transferred in time. for that reason, it is understood 
that social security is some sort of indirect-wage payment, and labour 
and capital’s taxes for social security simply set aside funds to finance 
future ss payments. according to the standard vision, social security 
contributions have a certain value that  –transferred in time (as if on a 
time machine)– will finance future benefits for today’s contributors.
the standard view is inspired in a pre-marxian comprehension of 
value that sees it as a thing or material substance (friot, 1999). on the 
contrary Marx proposed –and we concur–value is not something that 
can be stored and transferred in time (féliz, 2008c). Value is produced 
and reproduced by today’s labour applied to capitalist production for 
it is, above all, a social relation. this means that all taxes destined to fi-
nance social security are merely a deduction from current surplus va-
lue (for current consumption) and not a means for transferring value 
to the future. this understanding is the basis for the proposal of basic 
income (BI) as an alternative to current social and income polices.
the creation of an unconditional income allowance (cash trans-
fer) or BI has been widely analyzed (for example, Lo Vuolo, 1996; ra-
ventós, 1999; Pérez et al., 2006; elgarte, 2008). the idea is to guaran-
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tee a minimum income to every member of the population regardless 
of their condition of employment, age or gender.
the BI is not just an income support program for the poor. the 
idea is not to locate a particular group of people in need (“the poor”) 
above of the poverty line. the BI implies a radical program of redis-
tribution of income to guarantee a minimum level of access to goods 
and services through unconditional income or cash transfers for each 
and every person in the country.
to us its most important justification is the growing socialization 
of labour and production. since social production is –increasingly– the 
result of socialized labour, it is evident the need to disengage income 
(and thus survival) from direct participation in production processes 
(abstract –value producing– labour) and concrete working activities. 
as society has become really subsumed in capital, even unemploy-
ment and reproduction activities are really part of social labour (ne-
gri, 2001). for that reason, today all labour is part of the production of 
value19. thus maintaining the direct tie of wages and salaried labour 
(as if this were the only necessary labour) contradicts the real process 
of abstraction of labour in modern capitalism20. greater socialization 
of production with the private appropriation of income and use-values 
entails a growing irrationality (since it lacks arguments to support it) 
and contradiction (since it accentuates the opposition between the 
possibilities and the reality of capitalist society)21.
a BI program implies and requires a massive deduction of resour-
ces from current surplus value. In general, the concrete alternatives 
propose to begin with a BI for every child under 18 years of age and 
the elderly over 70 years of age. our own estimations for argentina 
put the gross redistribution at roughly 9.8% of gDP –in 2004– for an 
unrestricted, population-wide BI (Pérez et al., 2006). In this case, the 
income for consumption of the wealthiest would have to be reduced in 
about 23%22. the poorest 20% of the population would see its availa-
19  of course, not all labour directly produces surplus value. however, all social 
labour is necessary for its direct or indirect production and circulation.
20  this process of real abstraction implies that all labour tends to become necessary 
labour. In fact, not only “manufacturing labour” creates value but all labour actually 
becomes really subordinated under capital and thus needed for capital’s reproduc-
tion. for that reason wages can no longer be the only means of paying for surplus-
value producing labour, which now pervades society as a whole.
21  as pointed out by Álvarez Leguizamón (2005), hayek also proposes a similar 
system but on a very different argument. hayek’s idea has more in common with 
friedman’s negative income tax proposal than with the BI proposal.
22  the estimation is a gross estimation of the amount needed to provide for a BI 
equal to the indigence line for all argentinean inhabitants. It does not take into ac-
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ble income increase 3.4 times23. In the case of argentina such redistri-
bution would not imply –in principle– the reduction in the rate of ac-
cumulation. as we’ve seen, dominant classes use a substantial portion 
of surplus value for their luxury, non-necessary consumption. In fact 
this is the other side of sustained income inequality in the country: the 
income of the upper 10% of the population is 28.7 times greater than 
that of the bottom 10% in 2008 (increasing from 22.8 times in 1998) 
(Lozano, 2009). this program could be financed completely from redi-
recting luxury consumption without directly affecting the profit rate.
the BI proposal would significantly reduce inequality by increa-
sing the bottom half of the distributional pyramid. since unequal 
distribution of income is one of the main sources of socio-political 
conflict (figueroa, 1998; rodrik, 1998), socio-political instability 
would be reduced, favouring investment, innovation and thus accu-
mulation. of course, the BI will not eliminate capitalism’s inherent 
social class conflict but improved general living conditions will facili-
tate social changes and innovations that could then be discussed in a 
framework not restricted by the fear of hunger or income poverty. In 
a way, social freedom will be enhanced (Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 
1986; offe, 1995).
furthermore, the reduced compulsion to work for a living will 
makes room for lower direct demands for higher wages. since BI 
would displace immediate needs from debate, workers would be able 
to put on the bargaining table of collective negotiations –with better 
leverage– the duration of labour time and working conditions. Direct 
wage costs would then be contained –in the short run– thus allowing 
for greater competitiveness, paid for not by work precariousness but 
by redistribution of socialized production24.
count the fact that a significant number of them would return this amount in paying 
higher personal income taxes. on the other hand, if the BI were equal to the poverty 
line our estimate put the gross redistribution at roughly 21.5% of gDP in 2004 (Pérez 
et al., 2006). this estimation does not take into account the higher personal income 
taxes paid and the fact that it would cancel itself out with some currently existing 
benefits for employed, salaried people (such as the benefit for child support).
23  argentina’s government has recently (late 2010) extended the benefit for child 
support to the children of the unemployed and a portion of the self-employed. while 
this has provided income support for more than 3 million children under 18 years of 
age, the implementation of the program implied the elimination of several other be-
nefits for poor families (such as the plan Familias), it is not generalized to the whole 
population and it is not unconditional. see Barrera (2009).
24  the implementation of a BI proposal may requiere some reforms in argentina’s 
health and educational system. since after neoliberal reforms both systems have been 
heavily privatised, the proposed redistribution may put pressure on prices in both 
services. the government would have to push forward reforms to decommodifie their 
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the BI proposal will produce other important, although contra-
dictory, effect. By greatly increasing income security the BI will redu-
ce compulsion to work. In capitalism the cost of unemployment is the 
main reason of the employers’ power, the BI will enter in conflict with 
the main means of coercion of the system. reduced fear of unemplo-
yment (actually, of its costs to workers) will improve labour’s bargai-
ning conditions and thus radically change the dynamics of capitalist 
enterprises, reducing the ability of capital to create and appropriate 
surplus-labour (value). thus, even though it might create the condi-
tions for greater economic democracy (by enhancing labour’s ability 
to achieve its political organization) the BI will face the generalized 
resistance of the dominant classes. this is a very important point in 
the discussion. the BI will create objective conditions for more eco-
nomic democracy meaning that it will give workers (the majority of 
the people) greater possibilities to decide –with less compulsion– on 
matters of the social organization of production, working conditions, 
etc. society will be able to move a step forward from the “autocracy 
of capital” in the work place and in society, letting people have more 
freedom to participate on the political organization of social produc-
tion. however, since vertical –non democratic– organization of the 
production process –at the level of the individual enterprise as well 
as at the level of society as a whole– is the basis of capitalist political 
organization, even the faintest possibility of a BI will face significant 
opposition from dominant classes.
In any case, this proposal implies a very different conception of 
social security and will not pass without political dispute. the social 
and political organizations that have proposed it will have to struggle 
against common sense and the ideological and material hegemony of 
the capitalist class.
Conclusions
we analyzed the structural restrictions that social and income poli-
cies in argentina face due to its peripherical position in global capital. 
these restrictions pose serious limitations to the possibilities of tra-
ditional wage and income policies for they contradict the imperative 
of capital’s need for valorisation. while this necessity applies to every 
capitalist economy, in the case of peripherical nations –such as argen-
tina– it creates an insurmountable obstacle unless profound, progres-
sive and pro-labour changes in economic policies are put forth.
provision. this would imply further contradictory political pressure on the upper (do-
minant) classes. I wish to thank an anonymous referee for stressing the need to ak-
nowledge this fact.
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however, even within the peripherical international insertion a di-
fferent kind of social policy intervention can be used with greater suc-
cess: a basic income policy. even though such a policy does not lack res-
trictions and it is not unproblematic –particularly in political terms– it 
could not only attack (and even put an end to) income poverty, it would 
also provide with improved conditions for democratic social transfor-
mations. since the BI proposal could be financed at no direct or imme-
diate cost to accumulation, it could clearly provide with a road allowing 
for higher accumulation, lower political instability, greater economic 
democracy and no income-based social exclusion. this –of course– will 
enter in direct contradiction with the current organization of society 
and create a different sort of political commotion.
By actually eliminating income poverty, this allowance will allow 
working families to dispose of more time for free self-development 
by demanding lower working time. the expansion of disposable time 
would open the path to more ample radical/revolutionary (“pro-poor”, 
“pro-labour”) social changes, as organized active political participa-
tion will also have greater room for action. this alone –in our humble 
opinion– is sufficient motive to struggle for it.
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